Abstract: 

[Work in Progress, any/all feedback greatly appreciated!] Normative moral theories are frequently invoked to serve one of two distinct purposes: (1) explicate a criterion of rightness or (2) provide a decision-making procedure. A characterization of rightness does not necessarily provide a tractable way to achieve it, while a defensible decision-making procedure may sometimes yield actions that fail to be right. A clear articulation of this gap can be found in the two-level utilitarian theory of Richard Hare. He distinguishes between a 'critical' and 'intuitive' level of utilitarian thinking, where the former provides for the selection of moral principles and the latter for application of them to real-world situations. We aim in this paper to return to this general idea in light of forty additional years of (computational) cognitive science. We apply those frameworks to moral decision-making to ask: how ought a bounded human agent make ethical decisions?